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One might expect that children with varying genetic mutations or
children raised in low socioeconomic status environments would
display different deﬁcits. Although this expectation may hold for
phenotypic outcomes in older children and adults, cross-syndrome
comparisons in infancy reveal many common neural and sociocog-
nitive deﬁcits. The challenge is to track dynamic trajectories over
developmental time rather than focus on end states like in adult
neuropsychological studies. We contrast the developmental and
adult approaches with examples from the cognitive and social
domains, and we conclude that static models of adult brain lesions
cannot be used to account for the dynamics of change in genetic
and environmentally induced disorders in children.
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This paper examines some of the key differences between twointerpretations of genetic and environmental vulnerabilities in
children: one interpretation inspired by static adult neuropsy-
chological models and the other interpretation inspired by dy-
namic developmental accounts. This paper presents a rather
unusual blend of theoretical and empirical issues, a blend that we
deem critical to make our case. In the ﬁrst section, we contrast the
ways in which the static and dynamic paradigms have addressed
research on neurodevelopmental disorders and show why a de-
velopmental account is crucial to understanding the dynamics of
change. The next two sections use concrete examples to illustrate
a dynamic developmental approach to the cognitive and social
domains. One section focuses on a cognitive domain—infant
sensitivity to numerical displays—in two neurogenetic syndromes
and illustrates how the adult and developmental paradigms yield
very different interpretations of exactly the same data. The other
section takes a similar approach by examining examples from the
social domain—the effects of differences in parent–child in-
teraction. Throughout the paper, we argue that the adult neuro-
psychological model should no longer be applied to genetic and
environmental vulnerabilities that dynamically change over de-
velopmental time.
Static vs. Dynamic Approaches to Neurodevelopmental
Disorders
Research on neurodevelopmental disorders has often been in-
spired by models of adult neuropsychological patients (1, 2), which
is illustrated by the following quotation: “Williams syndrome can
be explained in terms of selective deﬁcits to an otherwise normal
modular system” (ref. 2, p. 347). By contrast, we have consistently
stressed the dynamic nature of neural and cognitive development
over time:
[B]rain volume, brain anatomy, brain chemistry, hemispheric asym-
metry, and the temporal patterns of brain activity are all atypical in
people with Williams syndrome. How could the resulting system be
described as a normal brain with parts intact and parts impaired,
as the popular view holds? Rather, the brains of infants with WS
develop differently from the outset, with subtle, widespread reper-
cussions (ref. 3, p. 393).
We termed this latter approach neuroconstructivism (3–6),
recognizing that the infant brain is not only less differentiated and
less modular than the adult brain but that, early on, it is highly
interconnected. Only through experience and pruning do brain
circuits gradually become increasingly specialized and localized
(i.e., relatively modularized) over the course of development (3, 7–
9). Environmental factors play a key role in ontogenesis (10), af-
fecting both gene expression and progressive neural specialization.
In sum, the application of the static adult neuropsychological
model to developmental disorders ignores the ontogenetic history
of the organism, and the roots of development are often critical for
understanding the dynamic trajectory that leads to the socio-
cognitive end state (11).
With this distinction between static and dynamic paradigms to
development in mind, we present cross-syndrome comparisons of
infant cognitive data, which lend themselves to two very different
interpretations. We then go on to extend similar reasoning to the
social domain.
Two Interpretations of Infant Sensitivity to Number in
Neurodevelopmental Disorders
Studies of adult neuropsychological patients have yielded a
double dissociation between numerical abilities that affects dif-
ferent intraparietal circuits—one circuit for computing exact
number and the other circuit for computing approximate nu-
merical quantities (1, 12, 13). Research on typically developing
(TD) infants reveals two similar systems that develop at different
rates (14–18). Small exact number discrimination involves the
computation of precise differences between one, two, three, or
four items. Large approximate number discrimination is the
ability to judge whether two quantities (e.g., 8 vs. 16 items) are
different without being able to count them; this ability relies on
magnitude judgments. Whether these two systems are innately
speciﬁed or emerge as the product of gradual brain specialization
remains a topic of considerable debate (19–21).
Here, we discuss ﬁndings (details in SI Text) from a study of
large approximate number discrimination and small exact num-
ber discrimination in infants with Down syndrome (DS) and
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compare them with our previous work on infants with Williams
syndrome (WS) (20, 21). We set the stage by ﬁrst summarizing
earlier ﬁndings from which we generated a prediction. Our initial
cross-syndrome design had examined only small exact number
discrimination in infants with WS and DS as well as two groups
of TD controls matched on either chronological age or mental
age. That study revealed that, like TD controls, infants with WS
succeeded in discriminating changes in small exact number,
whereas those infants with DS failed (21). We contrasted this
ﬁnding with the serious numerical deﬁcits that emerge in later
WS development (22–24) as well as a cross-syndrome study
showing that, although both syndromes are impaired relative to
TD controls, older children/adults with DS signiﬁcantly outstrip
those individuals with WS on a battery of mathematical tasks
(24). This ﬁnding would suggest that successful small exact
number discrimination in infancy does not predict subsequent
mathematical outcome.
At that juncture, data on large approximate number discrim-
ination in TD infants were emerging. It turned out that TD
infants can discriminate not only small numbers (one, two, and
three) as early as 3 mo but subsequently, large approximate
quantities; at 6 mo, they differentiate 8 dots from 16 dots (i.e., a
ratio of 1:2), and by 9–10 mo, they distinguish 8 dots from 12 dots
(i.e., a ratio of 2:3) (25, 26). Because infants with WS performed
like TD controls on small number but had serious problems with
subsequent mathematics, we hypothesized that their deﬁcits
might originate in early problems with large approximate quan-
tity discrimination. With a new group of infants/toddlers with
WS, we showed this hypothesis indeed to be the case (20). Just
like the WS infant group in the earlier study, the new WS infants
succeeded in discriminating small numbers. However, they
showed signiﬁcantly weaker discrimination of large approximate
quantities (20), even with the easy 1:2 ratio and despite being
signiﬁcantly older than the age at which TD infants succeed.
A cross-syndrome comparison was, however, critical to a hy-
pothesis (i.e., that large approximate number discrimination in
infancy might be more predictive of subsequent mathematical
abilities than small number discrimination). We, therefore, in-
dividually matched a new group of infants/toddlers (Table S1)
with DS to our previous infants/toddlers with WS (20), and we
tested them on the same two tasks measuring small (2 dots vs. 3
dots) and large (8 dots vs. 16 dots) number discrimination (Figs.
S1 and S2). We predicted that infants/toddlers with DS would
yield the opposite pattern as the infants/toddlers with WS.
Our results yielded a double dissociation between small exact
number and large approximate number in infancy in the two
neurogenetic syndromes. We replicated our previous ﬁndings
that infants/toddlers with DS have serious difﬁculties discrimi-
nating small exact numbers, but this time, we used a different
group of DS children of a similar age range, indicating that the
current DS group is a representative sample. Most interesting
was our demonstration that, unlike those children with WS (20),
infants/toddlers with DS, who failed small number discrimina-
tion, succeeded in discriminating differences in large approxi-
mate quantities (SI Text and Fig. S3). We argue that the DS
infant ability with large approximate quantities contributes to an
explanation of why older children with DS subsequently go on to
have better, albeit not normal, numerical abilities than their
chronological age- or mental age-matched WS counterparts (24).
One might object that the DS ﬁndings can be explained by the
fact that the small number task (2 dots vs. 3 dots) involved the
harder 2:3 ratio, whereas the large number task (8 dots vs. 16
dots) used the easier 1:2 ratio. Two reasons discount such an
explanation. First, the WS infancy data yield the opposite pat-
tern, and therefore, one of the tasks cannot be intrinsically more
difﬁcult than the other. Second, the TD literature has clearly
shown that small exact number discrimination is not subject to
ratio constraints, whereas large approximate number discrimi-
nation is subject to such constraints (14, 17, 25, 26).
At ﬁrst blush, our ﬁndings yield a double dissociation between
two neurogenetic syndromes, typical of ﬁndings in the adult neu-
ropsychological literature, that points to two separable numerical
subsystems, which some might claim to be innately speciﬁed as
either intact or impaired. Everything seems clear: for WS, one or
more of the 28 genes deleted on one copy of chromosome 7q11.23
contributes to a domain-speciﬁc deﬁcit in large approximate
number discrimination, while leaving intact the small number
system, and for DS, one or more of the extra genes on chromo-
some 21 contributes to a domain-speciﬁc deﬁcit in small exact
number discrimination, while sparing the large number system.
However, concepts like double dissociation, intact, and sparing
are borrowed from the adult neuropsychological literature. Are
they appropriate for developmental syndromes (3, 4, 27)? Do
numerical systems start out prespeciﬁed in the infant brain, al-
ready dissociated into separate subsystems, or do these subsystems
emerge over time through early cross-domain interactions as dif-
ferent brain circuits progressively specialized for different nu-
merical functions (3, 4, 19)?
To address these questions, it is critical to examine which other
aspects of development interact with infant sensitivity to numerical
displays. In adopting this more dynamic developmental perspec-
tive (5–7, 28, 29), we related our DS numerical ﬁndings to earlier
data on infant/toddler attention and saccadic eye movement
planning in the two syndromes (30). The attention studies iden-
tiﬁed deﬁcits in both syndromes—problems with attention shifting
in WS and problems with sustained attention in DS. The eye
movement research revealed that infants/toddlers with DS had
similar patterns to TD infants (i.e., efﬁcient saccadic eye move-
ment planning), whereas those infants/toddlers withWS displayed
severe deﬁcits (30). We, thus, hypothesized that infants/toddlers
with WS might be impaired with respect to their scanning of large
numerical displays. To further explore this hypothesis, after the
experiment, we used the Tobii Infrared 1750 Eye Tracker (31) and
were able to subsequently collect data from some of the atypical
infants while they were viewing numerical displays on the com-
puter screen. Unfortunately, as can be the case when testing
atypical infants, it was often difﬁcult to calibrate their eye move-
ments and thus, obtain sufﬁcient data for statistical analysis.
Nonetheless, an initial examination of scanning patterns of the few
infants who did provide useful eye tracking data indicates that, like
our studies of eye movement planning and attention (30), those
children with DS tended to scan the overall array, whereas those
children with WS tended to remain ﬁxated on a few individual
items (illustrations of WS and DS scanning patterns for large ap-
proximate number are in Fig. S4).
We, therefore, argue that the numerical deﬁcits in WS may be
rooted in basic level visuoattention problems that cascade over
developmental time on other emerging cognitive level domains,
such as number. For WS, a serious deﬁcit in rapid saccade plan-
ning (30) causes problems in visually disengaging from individual
objects in displays. This ﬁnding likely explains why WS infants/
toddlers succeed at small exact number discrimination but have
difﬁculty discriminating large approximate quantities. The op-
posite is true for infants with DS, because their problems lie in
difﬁculties with sustained attention (32, 33), which makes it dif-
ﬁcult for them to individuate objects in small displays. Thus,
rather than identifying a double dissociation between the syn-
dromes, a single basic level problem for each syndrome—atten-
tion shifting in WS and sustained attention in DS—contributes to
the explanation of both the proﬁciencies and deﬁcits in each
syndrome concerning early sensitivities to differences in small and
large numerical displays.
It is possible that an even more basic problem contributes to
these differences, one which is again more domain-general and
outside the domain of number. The work by Dakin et al. (34)
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reinterpreted numerosity processing in terms of the ratios be-
tween low and high spatial frequencies (LSF/HSF) in displays.
Interestingly, individuals with WS have difﬁculty with LSF dis-
plays, and individuals with DS have problems with HSF displays
(35, 36). Irrespective of whether the numerical problems are
directly in the HSF and LSF demands on the visual system and/
or related to differences in attention mechanisms, it is clear that
the deﬁcits and proﬁciencies of each syndrome (and perhaps, the
different onset timing of small and large number discrimination
in TD infants) do not entail an explanation solely in terms of
domain-speciﬁc number abilities.
Clearly, these early cross-syndrome differences should not be
interpreted in the adult neuropsychological terms of a double
dissociation in numerical abilities, with small number impaired
and large number spared in DS and vice versa in WS. Rather, the
differences are likely to be traceable to basic level deﬁcits or
proﬁciencies in the visual and attention systems early in de-
velopment, which have cascading effects on cognitive level out-
comes over ontogenetic time.
Our studies highlight the need for syndrome-speciﬁc in-
tervention. Importantly, training for number should not start out
being domain-speciﬁc (i.e., focused on number per se). For WS,
we suggest that training initially targets rapid visual saccade
planning very early in the developmental trajectory, which could
lead to an enhancement of their scanning abilities and encourage
a focus on global quantities rather than only individual objects.
For DS, by contrast, training in sustained attention might be more
appropriate, leading to a focus on individual objects with better
discrimination of small number displays. Our future research will
coregister high-density event-related potentials (ERP) and eye
tracking in older toddlers to ascertain whether such syndrome-
speciﬁc training regimens impact on brain specialization over
developmental time in these neurodevelopmental syndromes.
Our ﬁndings alert scientists to the limitations of some tradi-
tional developmental research focused on single age groups or
single syndromes. They highlight the theoretical and applied
importance of a neuroconstructivist approach [i.e., tracing cog-
nitive level functions back to their basic level roots in infancy and
then probing their ontogenetic progression (4, 6, 37), which
elucidates how number abilities initially interact with other de-
veloping capacities, such as attention and visual scanning]. They
also underline the critical role that cross-syndrome comparisons
play in the planning of syndrome-speciﬁc intervention. Crucially,
the cross-syndrome number study challenges the use of neuro-
psychological models of adult brain lesions for explanations of
early proﬁciencies or deﬁcits in neurodevelopmental syndromes.
Extending the Neuroconstructivist Approach to the Social
Domain: Need for In-Depth Studies of Environments
This same neuroconstructivist, cross-syndrome approach can be
extended to the social domain. Hitherto, experimental research
into social impairments in, for example, autism spectrum dis-
orders (ASDs), has often focused on older children and adults
compared with TD controls (38, 39). However, the social deﬁcits
in ASD are likely to be rooted in early infancy (40, 41). We
believe that a comparison between infants with WS and infants
with ASD might constitute a fruitful avenue of research, despite
the obvious syndromic differences. Genetically, the two syn-
dromes are indeed different, with ASD likely to be caused by
multiple genes of small effect and WS caused by a heterozygous
deletion of some 28 contiguous genes on chromosome 7q11.23.
Phenotypically, individuals with WS seem to have the opposite
social proﬁle of individuals with ASD (6, 38). Individuals with
ASD are aloof and ﬁnd looking at eyes and faces disconcerting,
whereas individuals with WS are socially disinhibited and fasci-
nated by eyes and faces. Individuals with ASD prefer to interact
with objects, whereas individuals with WS actively seek engage-
ment with people. Individuals with ASD fare better on spatial
tasks compared with language and communication, whereas
individuals with WS are more proﬁcient at linguistic than spatial
tasks. In sum, the two syndromes seem to present with very
different sociocommunicative proﬁles in both childhood and
adulthood (6, 38). However, if we assess their proﬁles during
infant and toddler development, numerous cross-syndrome
similarities emerge. Both syndromes have difﬁculty with rapid
eye movement planning. Both have problems with attentional
disengagement. Both display atypical eye gaze following and
atypical referential pointing, and both are poor at triadic atten-
tion (6, 40, 41). From a neural perspective, both have atypical
cortical maturation, corpus callosum abnormalities, impaired
orbitofrontal cortex/amygdala connectivity, and dorsal and ven-
tral stream vulnerabilities, with gray and white matter integrity
being compromised in both (42). There are, of course, differ-
ences between the syndromes, particularly in later neuro- and
sociocognitive outcomes, but tracing their increasingly diverging
developmental outcomes back to their commonalities in infancy
could reveal more subtle deﬁcits than the more obvious com-
parison with TD controls. This is particularly true when start
states are similar but sociocognitive end states are different.
A number of teams worldwide are carrying out longitudinal
studies of infants within families in which an older sibling has al-
ready been diagnosed with ASD. The studies aim to uncover
neural, cognitive, and behavioral markers of ASD not only in
toddlerhood but in early infancy before the age at which the syn-
drome is normally diagnosed (40, 41). However, before a marker
can be identiﬁed as autism-speciﬁc, cross-syndrome comparisons
are crucial. Ongoing research in our laboratory is using the same
protocol as the London British Autism Study of Infant Siblings (41)
—behavioral experiments, eye tracking, resting state EEG, ERP,
questionnaires, and standardized tests—with infants with other
syndromes as well as infants from low socioeconomic status (SES)
backgrounds. Our studies will be addressing the following ques-
tions. (i) Which processes are syndrome-speciﬁc, and which are
syndrome-general? (ii) Which are modality-speciﬁc vs. -general?
(iii) Are the neural and sociocognitive processes different, even
when overt behavior is similar? (iv) Over time, is there compen-
sation or compounding of effects? It will be critical to follow each
syndrome’s trajectory over developmental time at multiple levels of
analysis, including changes in gene expression, neural circuit acti-
vation, and sociocognitive processes.
One question to emerge from cross-syndrome comparisons is
why the positive effects of high SES are not greater in families
with infants with genetic disorders. Unlike children from low SES
environments (43–47), many children with neurogenetic syn-
dromes are well-nourished, grow up in a caring environment,
receive considerable cognitive stimulation, and do not suffer the
physical and mental abuses that exist in some contexts of early
social adversity. Therefore, why do such positive environments
not compensate for genetic vulnerabilities? Is it just the severity of
the genetic mutations that constrains environmental effects? Or is
it possible that this ﬁnding is not only because of a genetically
compromised computational system but also the fact that early
environments differ in more subtle ways than is commonly re-
alized? Having a neurodevelopmental disorder not only involves
genetic mutations; it also modiﬁes the environment in which the
atypical infant develops. We hypothesize that the moment that
a parent is informed that their child has a genetic disorder, the
parent’s behavior subtly changes. As a result, the baby’s responses
within the dyadic interaction will also be subtly modiﬁed.
A couple of examples serve to illustrate this hypothesis. The
ﬁrst example is from motor development. Observational data
from families who visit our laboratory reveal that parents of
infants/toddlers with genetic syndromes often ﬁnd it difﬁcult
(compared with parents of TD infants) to allow their atypically
developing offspring to freely mouth objects to explore their
properties with the sensitive nerve endings in the mouth or crawl/
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walk uninhibited around the laboratory to fully discover their
environment. We speculate that this reticence is because of a nat-
ural fear of accidents in vulnerable infants, but it nonetheless results
in a less richly explored environment. The second example is from
vocabulary learning (48). When TD toddlers start to name things,
their parents allow them to overgeneralize. By contrast, in the case
of toddlers with DS, for instance, parents veto overgeneralizations
and correct immediately (48). We speculate that this ﬁnding is
because they fear that their child with lower intelligence will never
learn the right term if allowed to overgeneralize. However, initial
overgeneralization in the TD child encourages category formation
(e.g., by calling different animals cat, the child starts to create an
implicit animal category), and categorization is known to be im-
paired in several neurodevelopmental disorders. We propose that
such unconscious assumptions about what atypical children can and
cannot learn may unwittingly lead parents to provide less variation
in linguistic input and in general, a less varied environment to
explore. These quite subtle environmental changes are likely to
compound over time.
There is, therefore, a vital need for a more dynamic notion of
environment (e.g., how having a neurodevelopmental disorder
may subtly change the social, cognitive, linguistic, emotional,
and physical environments in which the atypically developing
child grows).
What about typical development? Are environments basically
the same for those TD infants who suffer neither genetic nor
environmental vulnerabilities? In fact, subtle individual differ-
ences in social interaction, even in the TD case, are ubiquitous
and just as likely to become biologically embedded. Our study of
the effects of differences in typical mother–infant interaction on
the timing of infant cognitive milestones addressed this point
(49). Healthy monolingual infants each underwent testing at 6-
and 10-mo of age in several experimental tasks (i.e., processing
of speech, human goal-directed actions, physical events, etc.) as
well as videotaped recordings of mother/infant dyadic play with
a structured set of toys. Our ﬁndings highlight the effects of
differences in mother–infant interaction styles on the timing of
the onset of cognitive milestones. At the group level, 6- and 10-
mo-olds displayed all of the expected effects found in previous
research. However, when we reanalyzed our data according to
mother–child interaction ratings, the quality of dyadic inter-
action style—sensitive vs. controlling—turned out to subtly fos-
ter or delay development.
One might have expected that it would be dyads high on the
sensitivity rating whose achievement of cognitive milestones
would be advanced across all domains (i.e., that the positive
effects of contingent mother–infant interaction would be do-
main-general). However, this expectation was not the case. For
the domains of both physical event and speech processing, the
infants from dyads with high sensitivity were, indeed, in advance
of their peers (i.e., sensitive, contingent interaction fostered
earlier specialization). By contrast, the opposite held for the
processing of human goal-directed actions. In the latter case, it
was the infants of the more controlling mothers who displayed
earlier specialization.
Why are the infants of controlling mothers the ones who show
earlier success in processing human goal-directed actions? Our
analyses of the details of the dyadic play sessions revealed that
controlling mothers tended to impose their own choice of toy on
their infants and keep changing the toys, without showing sen-
sitivity to the infant’s current focus of attention. In this way, the
more controlling mothers force their infants to frequently pro-
cess the mother’s goals rather than focusing on their own goals.
By contrast, the sensitive mothers altered their own goals to
follow their infants’ focus of attention. These subtle variations in
dyadic interaction style, we contend, place different processing
demands on infants when interpreting human social interaction,
helping to explain the differences in onset timing of the infants’
understanding of human goal-oriented actions (49).
The reason why infants from sensitive dyads show earlier
specialization in speech processing is in the fact that the dyadic
play sessions showed that such mothers provide their offspring
with a greater variety of appropriate level input. The more
controlling mothers, by contrast, varied their speech less, without
taking into account the progressively changing nature of their
infants’ vocalizations. Much the same applied to physical event
processing. The controlling mothers tended to interrupt their
infants’ exploration of objects and offer them a succession of new
toys, whereas the sensitive mothers left their infants sufﬁcient
time to fully explore the properties of objects, which would, we
believe, enhance their growing knowledge of physical objects.
If such subtle differences in early mother–infant interaction in
TD infants growing up in nonadverse environments can have
such effects on the timing of cognitive milestones (49), the de-
velopmental trajectories of those infants who grow up with ge-
netic or environmental vulnerabilities are likely to be even more
heavily inﬂuenced. Nothing is static in biology or psychology, and
this ﬁnding holds equally for the environment.
Conclusions
Infant research has tended to raise static questions reminiscent
of those questions asked of adult neuropsychological patients.
Which modules are impaired, and which are intact? In which
regions of the brain are they located? How are syndromes dis-
sociated? By contrast, throughout this paper, we have advocated
a more dynamic set of questions. How do phenotypic outcomes
originate in infancy? How do neural circuits change over time?
Which domains interact across their developmental trajectories?
How can we use the cross-syndrome design to reveal more subtle
differences than comparisons with TD controls? How do the
multiple aspects of the dynamically changing environment affect
development? Indeed, rather than the static approach of much
of adult neuropsychology, scientists’ basic question in studying
genetic or environmental vulnerabilities should always be: is
there a developmental explanation?
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